Mr. Whitaker is right. Something does stink here. It is completely wrong to allow council to decide if there is a ‘conflict of interest’. Self policing isn’t working. Perhaps anyone elected to council should publicly list ALL of their financial dealings and holdings, list clients if they are an attorney, list property and investments of themselves and spouses/partners.

What other potential conflicts are there for City Place? Did anything turn up in the just released emails?

Independent authorities like the DDA and AATA are supposed to have some degree of autonomy and serve a specific mission. I don’t agree with the mayor’s view. You could argue that for the LDFA, the councilmember designated slot is similar to that designated for the city’s CEO on the DDA – a person specifically there to represent the interests of the city government organization (as apart from those of the authority). In the case of the two TIFA authorities, their revenue stream comes from other taxing entities besides the city, so they have a responsibility to their mission beyond the narrow interests of the people running the city government at a particular moment in time.

I’m sorry that I don’t know the state statute that was cited in the county planning commission case. Also, I may not have explained it very clearly, since I don’t have the wording of the ruling.

The council rules regarding the mayor’s responsibilities cited in the article are identical to the city charter language.

Regarding the city administrator, the city charter specifies:

“SECTION 5.1.
(a) The City Administrator shall be the administrative agent of the Council, shall perform the duties of office under its authority, and shall be accountable to the Council for the performance of those duties. The City Administrator shall be chosen on the basis of executive and administrative qualifications.”

It’d be hard to make the case based on charter or council rules that the chief executive officer of the city is the city administrator. I think it comes from the fact that we have particular flavor of the mayor-council form of government, which designates most of the responsibility for execution to the administrator.

At the DDA mid-year retreat, Hieftje indicated that the reason he wanted to serve on the DDA board — as contrasted with his immediate predecessors as mayor, during which tenure the city administrator served on the DDA — was that he was interested in downtown issues.

How the break was achieved with the historical pattern of the city administrator serving on the Ann Arbor DDA board might have been connected chronologically to the retirement of Fraser’s predecessor, Berlin, and Fraser’s hire — I haven’t gone back to check.

On the point in [8], a question for Vivienne: Do you see a difference between the incompatibility of office you describe in [8] and the service of city councilmembers on various boards and commissions? For example, on planning commission, there is a designated slot for a city councilmember, which seems to meet the criteria for incompatibility of office you describe — or does the fact that it’s all under the umbrella of city of Ann Arbor make it different from the DDA board?

An interesting twist: the LDFA board, which is a close parallel to the DDA board (both oversee a TIF), specifies a slot for a city councilmember — currently held by Stephen Rapundalo.

Additional context for discussion is Hieftje’s view expressed at a Sunday night caucus that the DDA board is no different from the city’s planning commission with the only difference being that the DDA had a revenue stream.

Looking back at the DDA Act definition for CEO, I’d say that the “or” between “mayor” and “city manager” (assuming that a city manager is the same as our city administrator), could be interpreted to mean that we have a choice (and also that that act isn’t in conflict with the Home Rule Act.) Then maybe the question is, “who decides which of the two gets the DDA seat?”

But then, maybe there’s yet another piece of legislation (the city charter?) that indicates which of the two our community considers to be the CEO. I’m still guessing that it’s the administrator, which I also think would be more appropriate (though I’d like to hear other opinions.) And if that were the case, we’d still have the question of whether that’s Roger Fraser or his designee.

There is a legal issue with people serving on two different boards where their actual duties are in conflict. I don’t have a copy of the opinion now, but there has been case law at the state level regarding “incompatibility” of office or service. This is where the actions of the individual on the one board can overrule the action of the other board, or where the interests of one board might not be the same as the other, so a consistent recusal might be necessary. When I was on the county planning commission, all the township officials who were then serving on both the planning commission and the Board of Public Works were forced to either resign their township position or relinquish their planning commission appointment. It was before some current changes in the state planning law, but the point was that as township officials they might advance one decision and the county planning commission would then have to take action, possibly contrary. Some made one decision, some another. It made a big difference in the representation on the planning commission.

I believe that it is an incompatible office for a city staff person to occupy a position on an independent board such as the AATA. As to the DDA, it could be argued that since city council can overrule DDA decisions, it is incompatible for a councilmember to serve on that board. That would be for the lawyers to argue.

Part of the resolution that was originally expected to be brought at this most recent meeting would have increased the rate at the highest-demand meters (those generating more than $2000 per year) to $1.50 per hour — but to drop the rates for lowest demand meters (those generating less than $500 per year) to $.80 per hour.

Re: [4] “Of COURSE it’s a conflict for a City Council member to sit on the DDA Board.”

I think it’s worth distinguishing between (i) possibly conflicting responsibilities to two different bodies and (ii) possible conflict between one’s responsibility to a body and one’s own interest.

In the case of Smith’s dual role on the city council and the DDA board, it’s (i). To my mind, the question of breadth of expertise and interest represented on the two bodies (city council and DDA) is a more useful framework to think about the issue than “conflict.”

In the case of Carsten Hohnke’s possible connection to the City Place project — to which I assume [4] alludes — it’s a case of (ii).

To clarify the remark in [4] further, council rules specify as a condition of recusal that the interest on which there’s a conflict
be financial. That is, it’s not the case that any connection at all to the issue is supposed to be adequate grounds for recusal. For example, a councilmember might be best friends with the developer, attend his private parties, etc. but if there’s no direct financial benefit to the councilmember, that’s not adequate grounds for recusal from voting on the developer’s project when it comes before council.

Also, it’s worth reiterating the note in [4] that council rules specify a duty by councilmembers to vote, unless a councilmember’s colleagues vote to ask for recusal.

That, I think, actually makes some kind of sense — one could imagine someone citing “conflicts of interest” just to avoid having to vote on a controversial issue. You can’t just willy nilly abstain from voting. So the intent of that mechanism is on target, I think.

In the case of City Place, at the most recent council meeting, Hohnke declared at the table that he’d conveyed the facts of a possible conflict to his colleagues and the city attorney. His colleagues did not then ask him to recuse himself, and that was that.

I think it’s unfortunate that Hohnke did not see fit to declare at the table in some kind of summary form the set of facts that led him to call his colleagues’ attention to the possible conflict. What that conveys is that the council in its wisdom will decide the matter — without serving up the decision to public second-guessing. The public consensus could well be that Hohnke has a conflict that should reasonably prevent him from voting on the project.

That’s not to say that the public should have a say in whether someone is recused or not — just that facts underlying the decision should be open and subject to the consequences of public opinion on the matter. And that includes the possible consequence of a public consensus view that the city council made a well-reasoned and wise choice on Hohnke’s (non-)recusal.

From the Home Rule City Act of 1909:

“Sec. 3. Each city charter shall provide for all of the following:
(a) The election of a mayor, who shall be the chief executive officer of the city, and of a body vested with legislative power, and for the election or appointment of a clerk, a treasurer, an assessor or board of assessors, a board of review, and other officers considered necessary.”

Without the definition clause of the DDA enabling legislation cited in the article, I think there would be no choice at all whether to appoint the city administrator or the mayor to the DDA.

No question, though, that the discussion to clarify this situation should be interesting.