From left: Assistant city attorney Abigail Elias, city attorney Stephen Postema and co-counsel for the plaintiffs Irvin Mermelstein. The photo is from the July 2, 2014 hearing on a preliminary injunction in the Yu v. Ann Arbor case, which judge Donald Shelton denied.

The latest procedural issues now appear set to be decided on Aug. 27, 2014 – judge Donald Shelton’s final motion day before his retirement.

The case involves a claim of unconstitutional takings – inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs in the case, Yu v. City of Ann Arbor, are three Ann Arbor residents who had their footing drains disconnected under the city FDD program.

The procedural issues that could be decided next week include a motion to disqualify the city attorney’s office from representing the city due to conflicts; a motion to sanction city attorneys for filing documents with statements that plaintiffs allege are not well-grounded in fact; and a motion to reassign the case to a judge other than Timothy Connors. All three motions were filed with the court on Wednesday, Aug. 20.

A dispute about whether those Aug. 20 filings were properly served upon the city is one of the issues Shelton could decide at the start of the hearing.

By way of background, the case was originally filed in the Washtenaw County 22nd circuit court and assigned to Shelton in late February. The city then removed the case to federal court. However, the plaintiffs moved for remand from the federal court back to the circuit court – a motion that was granted by judge Avern Cohn in late May.

When the case returned to the circuit court, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which was heard and denied by Shelton in early July. The city had filed a motion for summary disposition on June 9, which was originally scheduled for July 30. It was subsequently rescheduled by the city for Aug. 13, and then shifted by the city again to Sept. 18 – which is after Shelton’s scheduled retirement.

According to the court administrator’s office, the case will not officially be reassigned to a different judge until Sept. 2. However, when The Chronicle inquired with the 22nd circuit court’s central scheduling office, the staff indicated that the plan was to reassign all of Shelton’s civil cases to Connors. So the city’s paperwork scheduling of the Sept. 18 hearing specifies Connors as the judge.

Motion on Reassignment

The Sept. 18 hearing date on the city’s motion for summary disposition could change if Shelton grants the motion to reassign the case to a judge other than Connors.

The motion to reassign is based on the fact that attorney Mark Koroi is co-counsel for the plaintiffs. According to the brief in support of the motion to reassign the case away from Connors, Koroi has filed four Judicial Tenure Commission grievances against Connors, two of which have been upheld. Koroi’s brief also notes that he has engaged in “vigorous public advocacy against political candidacies of both Timothy Connors and his wife.”

The plaintiff’s brief notes that Michigan court rules stipulate that it is the challenged judge who must make an initial ruling on a motion for disqualification, so the motion to reassign is a proactive measure to eliminate the need to file a motion in front of Connors, which would asked that Connors disqualify himself. [Aug. 20, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor brief on reassignment]

The city’s response brief argues that the motion is actually a motion for disqualification, and as such the motion is premature and should be heard by Connors. The city also argues explicitly against the idea that Connors should be disqualified, noting that if political speech critical of a judge were adequate grounds for disqualification, then an attorney could engage in such speech specifically so that the attorney would never have to appear in front of that judge.

The city also argues that the brief in support of the motion to reassign doesn’t provide any evidence that Connors is aware of Koroi’s political advocacy or that Connors is actually biased against Koroi. [Aug. 22, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor response brief on reassignment]

Motion for Sanctions

A second motion filed on Aug. 20 for hearing on Aug. 27 is to sanction the city attorney’s office for filing papers that are “neither well-grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” The papers in question are the city’s brief in support of its motion for summary disposition. [June 9, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor brief on summary disposition]

Included in the plaintiffs’ claims asking for sanctions to be imposed are that some of the key arguments in the city’s motion for summary judgment are frivolous. Plaintiffs assert that the city’s argument that the plaintiffs’ complaint is time-barred is frivolous. The plaintiffs then argue that one of the city’s positions – that the plaintiffs’ federal claims should be dismissed – is crucially based on the city’s contention that the claims are time-barred.

The plaintiffs’ brief in support of sanctions also asserts that the city has mischaracterized the plaintiffs’ position, highlighting instances where the city states that the plaintiffs have “recognized” or “conceded” some key aspect of the city’s legal position. The plaintiffs argue that the plaintiffs have not recognized or conceded the things that the city claims in its brief. [Aug. 20, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor brief on sanctions]

For example, the city claims in its brief that [emphasis added]:

Plaintiffs recognize that they own the sump pumps they installed and that the sump pumps and footing drain system operate as an integral part of their houses; in other words that neither the city nor a third party owns anything located in their homes, occupies their properties, or has otherwise taken their properties.

The claim is presented in the “introduction” section of the city’s brief, a section of pleadings where recitations of uncontroversial fact are typically presented. The question of pump ownership and occupation of residents’ homes by the third party are central points of dispute in the case. The plaintiffs’ brief in support of sanctions argues that the citations by the city to the plaintiffs’ pleadings – in support of the claim of “recognition” – do not in fact support a claim of “recognition.”

Another claim by the city – presented in the “background facts” portion of its brief in support of summary disposition – is that [emphasis added]:

“Plaintiffs concede that Sec. 1.1 [the footing drain disconnection ordinance] was adopted by the City to address the public health, safety and welfare issues of sanitary sewer back-ups in basements and sanitary overflows.”

The portion of the plaintiffs’ brief cited by the city in making that characterization does not, according to the plaintiffs, provide any support for the city’s contention that a concession has been made. And elsewhere in the plaintiffs’ brief, they state [emphasis added]:

Upon information and belief, the Ordinance was not enacted in response to emergency conditions or some other imminent threat to public health, safety or welfare. Rather, the Ordinance was enacted by the City in order to facilitate a solution to long-standing and self-created conditions in the least expensive and/or most expedient way possible.

Based on the city’s descriptions of the plaintiffs’ statements, the plaintiffs contend that the city is distorting the record. From the plaintiffs’ brief in support of sanctions:

This level of mischaracterization goes beyond zealous advocacy: it is misleading and is unfair to both the Court and to the Plaintiffs, whose lawyers are forced to ferret out mischaracterizations and distortions of the record when they should be responding to a “fair presentation of the issues” by opposing counsel.

The city’s response to the plaintiffs’ brief in support of sanctions deals with the part involving plaintiffs’ frivolous legal arguments by arguing for the merit of those arguments.

In its brief opposing sanctions, the city responds to the plaintiffs’ contention that their statements have been misrepresented to the court by insisting that the city’s characterization is based on the plaintiffs’ recitation of facts – and an attachment to the complaint of the city’s written “homeowner’s package” for sump pump install-ees.

The city’s position appears to be that whatever factual claims and characterizations that are made in the “homeowner’s package” were recognized and represented to the court by the plaintiffs as true – by dint of the attachment of the “homeowner’s package” to the plaintiffs complaint as an exhibit. So the city is not analyzing the plaintiffs’ exhibit merely as a representation by the plaintiff as to what the city itself claims to be true (via public documents produced by the city), but also what the plaintiff is recognizing to be true. [Aug. 22, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor response brief on sanctions]

The city blames any misunderstanding on the plaintiffs, arguing that the plaintiffs wrote poorly worded filings. From the city’s response brief, opposing sanctions:

[T]he City has not mischaracterized Plaintiffs’ Complaint, but has simply analyzed it as written by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with the City’s reading of their Complaint arises from Plaintiffs’ own failure to draft a well-pleaded Complaint.

Motion on Disqualification

A third motion filed by the plaintiffs for hearing on Aug. 27 is one that would disqualify assistant city attorney Abigail Elias, and thereby the city attorney’s office, from representing the city in this lawsuit. [Aug. 20, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor brief in support of disqualification]

The brief arguing for disqualification cites an email sent by plaintiffs’ counsel in early February notifying Elias that she would likely be called as a witness in the case:

I am advising that your non-privileged testimony and evidence will likely be required in connection with litigation over the FDDP, which is now in preparation for filing. The case will include a claim for inverse condemnation. You are a necessary witness on both liability and relief, which probably comes as no surprise.

The plaintiffs argue partly on grounds that they need to depose Elias as a reason to disqualify her as the city’s representation.

In its brief in opposition to the motion on disqualification, the city contends that there is no testimony that Elias is in a unique position to provide other than testimony that would be subject to the attorney-client privilege. [Aug. 22, 2014 Yu v. City of Ann Arbor brief opposing disqualification]

The city also contends that disqualification of its city attorneys would be prejudicial to the city, because “Ms. Elias has been involved with the FDD program since its inception 13 years ago. Her familiarity with and knowledge of the issues in this case from those years cannot be replicated easily or quickly.”

Hearing

The next hearing is currently scheduled for Aug. 27 at 1:30 p.m. in front of judge Donald Shelton at the 22nd circuit courthouse, 101 E. Huron in downtown Ann Arbor.

The city lost both phases of the litigation, which began when the city sought to enforce city charter eligibility requirements against Dascola to prevent him from being a candidate in the Ward 3 city council Democratic primary race. The election was won by Julie Grand in a three-person field that included Samuel McMullen.

The $35,431.75 amount is the total agreed to for the initial phase of the lawsuit on city charter eligibility requirements ($30,731.75), plus half the amount that was agreed to in the second phase, which involved the counting of misprinted ballots ($9,400). The other half of the $9,400 will be paid by the state of Michigan, which intervened in the second phase of the lawsuit. So the total paid to Dascola’s attorney, Tom Wieder, will be $40,132, which includes court costs.

Fees for the initial phase of the lawsuit were settled on June 19, 2014 – at $30,731.75. That total includes attorney fees in the amount of $30,306.25 – which was the result of 93.25 hours billed at an hourly rate of $325. The remainder of that total was $425.50 – costs for filings and document retrieval.

The motion for fees in the second phase of the lawsuit was filed by Wieder on Aug. 19, 2014 and asked for a total of $12,320 based on 30.80 hours of work at $400 per hour. Wieder’s filing parcels out each item of work to either the city or the state or to both jointly. The amount was reduced to $9,400 through back-and-forth among Wieder, the state and the city, with the final settlement splitting the amount evenly between the city and the state. [.pdf of Aug. 19, 2014 motion for fees]

The initial phase of the lawsuit was decided in favor of Dascola on May 20, 2014. At issue were city charter durational requirements on voter registration and residency – that require city councilmembers to be registered to vote in the city and to be a resident of the ward they want to represent for at least a year prior to taking office. Dascola contended he met the residency requirement, but conceded that he fell short of the voter registration requirement. He did not register to vote in the city until Jan. 15, 2014. The court ruled that the requirements were not enforceable, because they’d been ruled unconstitutional in the early 1970s, and never re-enacted by the city. Dascola submitted sufficient signatures to qualify, so the impact of the ruling was that Dascola was supposed to appear on the Ward 3 ballot.

However through a series of errors, his name did not appear on the printed ballots and nearly 400 of the misprinted ballots were sent to Ward 3 absentee voters. A dispute arose over how ballots would be counted if someone did not return one of the replacement ballots. The state of Michigan intervened on behalf of the Bureau of Elections, which told the city to go ahead and count the ballots. But on July 22, 2014 the federal court ruled that such ballots should not be counted.

The kind of city charter eligibility requirements that triggered the lawsuit in the first place should not become an issue in the future, if Ann Arbor voters approve charter amendments that the city council has voted to place on the Nov. 4, 2014 ballot.

This meeting is a regular event in the election process, and will include the approval of the list of election workers for the Aug. 5, 2014 primary. The three-member commission consists of chief of police John Seto, city attorney Stephen Postema and city clerk Jackie Beaudry.

Possibly of more interest than the approval of the list of election workers will be an update on proceedings in the pending legal dispute over the way that some misprinted ballots might be counted. Nearly 400 misprinted ballots were sent out to Ward 3 absentee voters.

Printed correctly on the ballots were Julie Grand and Samuel McMullen. However, Bob Dascola – who had filed a successful lawsuit against the city in order to be a candidate – was mistakenly left off the ballots. The city has sent replacement ballots to those voters, with a letter of instructions.

Dascola’s position is that votes in the Ward 3 race that are cast on the misprinted ballots should not count. Dascola’s attorney, Tom Wieder, has filed a motion expressing that position – as post-judgment relief in the lawsuit that was won to put Dascola on the ballot in the first place. Michigan’s Secretary of State has filed a motion to allow that state agency to intervene in the lawsuit, and takes the position that such ballots should be counted. See ”Ann Arbor Ballot Dispute: Michigan Wants In” for Chronicle coverage.

At the election commission’s meeting, an update will also likely be provided on the status of the number of potentially disputed ballots. Votes that could be disputed are those that were cast on misprinted ballots for which a replacement ballot has not yet been received. As of yesterday, July 14, that number stood at 12. Of those 12, successful contact had been made with five of the voters, who indicated they’d be submitting a replacement ballot.

Update: Of the 392 voters who were sent misprinted ballots, 131 have returned correctly  printed replacement ballots. Only 10 misprinted ballots have been received that have not been replaced with a properly printed second ballot. That leaves more than 250 voters who received a misprinted ballot, who have not yet returned any ballot. Beaudry reported at the meeting that in elections with high-interest races  (like this year’s mayoral race), the percentage of returned absentee ballots could be 90% or higher. But she noted that often ballots are not returned until very close to the date of the election. So there’s still an outstanding possibility that a voter could send in a misprinted ballot, without sufficient time to rectify the situation. However, Beaudry reported that procedures are in place to ensure that anyone who turns in a misprinted ballot in person on Election Day will be provided a correctly printed ballot. Efforts are ongoing to make contract with those who have sent in a misprinted ballot. The election workers were all approved.

[.mp3 of July 15, 2014 election commission meeting]

From left: Bob Dascola, Secretary of State seal, city of Ann Arbor seal.

The motion on behalf of the Secretary of State was filed by the Michigan Attorney General on Friday, July 11. [.pdf of July 11, 2014 motion to intervene]

In-person voting for the election takes place on Aug. 5, 2014. But the point in dispute concerns ballots that were printed incorrectly and sent to absentee voters.  The question of counting votes has arisen because the incorrectly printed ballots omitted the name of one of the candidates. Printed correctly on the ballots were Julie Grand and Samuel McMullen. However, Bob Dascola – who had filed a successful lawsuit against the city in order to be a candidate – was mistakenly left off the ballots.

Just a few days after the roughly 400 incorrectly-printed ballots were sent out, the city sent out replacement ballots with a letter of instructions. The city is making additional efforts to contact voters who sent in an incorrectly-printed ballot – to reduce the potential number of ballots that might eventually be in dispute. The disputed question is whether to count any votes in the Ward 3 race that are might cast on an incorrectly printed ballot.

Amid the ballot-counting controversy, the candidates continue to campaign for the seat to represent Ward 3 in the city of Ann Arbor – a ward that has historically seen some close primary races. In 2009, the margin achieved by Stephen Kunselman over the Ward 3 incumbent, Leigh Greden, was just six votes.

All three candidates appeared in a League of Women Voters candidate forum earlier this week. Chronicle coverage in ”Ward 3 Candidate Forum: CTN Broadcast” includes an embedded video player for playing back the forum, along with a transcript in a scrollable text box.

The Ward 3 candidates are also invited to participate in the Ann Arbor Democratic Party city council candidate forum, scheduled for Saturday, July 12 at 10 a.m. at the Ann Arbor Community Center, 625 N. Main St. The Chronicle is planning to provide a live audio feed from that event.

The Secretary of State’s current position is that votes in the Ward 3 race that are cast with the incorrectly printed ballots should still be counted – if no replacement ballot is sent in by the voter. That’s a reversal of the state’s own position taken when the question was first considered. The state is asking the federal court to be allowed as an intervening party, in order to put its arguments in front of the court. The state’s motion to intervene comes after Bob Dascola’s attorney, Tom Wieder, filed a motion at the beginning of the week – on Monday, July 7 – seeking to prevent the city of Ann Arbor from counting Ward 3 votes cast on defective ballots.

Wieder’s July 7 motion was filed as a request for post-judgment relief in the federal case that was litigated to put Dascola’s name on the ballot in the first place. In that ruling, the court decided that the city charter eligibility requirements are not enforceable. Related to that, the city council is beginning to contemplate the steps necessary to make a change to those eligibility requirements.

The city’s response to Wieder’s motion, filed two days later, took no position on the question of how the ballots should be counted. But the entire response brief, including exhibits, runs 49 pages. [.pdf of city of Ann Arbor's July 9, 2014 response] The reply from Wieder on Dascola’s behalf was filed the following day. [.pdf of July 10, 2014 reply brief]

The week began with Wieder’s motion on July 7, the same day that the city council held its regular meeting, on the first Monday of the month. A closed session held by the council that night reportedly included the topic of the ballot counting question.  The following morning, at the July 8, 2014 meeting of the Ann Arbor election commission, city attorney Stephen Postema portrayed the dispute as one between the Secretary of State and Dascola, on which the city was not going to take a position.

At the end of the election commission’s July 8 meeting, it appeared that both Wieder and Postema were not sanguine about the prospects that a ruling could be obtained from the federal court as early as next Tuesday, July 15. That’s when the election commission meets next. They seemed to be hoping for a decision from the court as quickly as a federal court could act – which they did not seem to think was all that quickly.

But the court seems to be handling at least some of the mechanical and logistical issues very quickly, and seems eager to expedite. Later in the day, on July 8, Wieder filed a motion for expedited consideration of his earlier motion, filed July 7 – which asked the court to enjoin the city from counting votes in Ward 3 races, if they are cast with one of the incorrectly printed ballots. And on the same day, the court granted that motion to expedite and ordered a briefing schedule that required the city to respond to Wieder’s motion by 8 a.m. on Thursday, July 10. Wieder’s reply was due at 10 a.m. the same morning. [.pdf of July 8, 2014 motion for expedited schedule] [.pdf of July 8, 2014 order on expedited schedule]

The motion to intervene, filed by the Secretary of State, could slow the pace of the decision. The Secretary of State’s motion to intervene is based on a basic assertion of the right to do so. From the motion:

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), “[o]n timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who…claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.”

Included in the Secretary of State’s filing is the brief that it would like the court to consider, if it is admitted as an intervening party.  That brief identifies four key questions believed by the Secretary of State to be central to the court’s ruling on Wieder’s July 7 motion:

CONCISE STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Whether this Court should abstain from ruling on this matter where there are substantial issues of state law involving the authority of the Secretary of State to issue direction and guidance to the local clerks and there are ongoing efforts to establish coherent state policy?
2. Is Dascola’s claim ripe where: (a) efforts are underway to contact the absentee voters who were sent replacement ballots and (b) where the ballots in question may not determine the outcome, and thus Dascola cannot show that he has yet been injured?
3. Whether voters who returned a ballot that was defective through a printing error should be disenfranchised based on Plaintiff’s assumption of what voters might otherwise have done in the absence of a printing error?
4. Whether under Michigan law, the Secretary of State has the authority to issue direction and guidance to the local clerks without promulgating formal rules?

The initial phase of the lawsuit ended with the court ruling that the city of Ann Arbor’s city charter requirements were not legally enforceable. That initial phase resulted in a settlement of legal fees in the amount of $30,731 to be paid to Wieder. That amount was based on 93.25 hours of work.

Based on records produced to The Chronicle under a Freedom of Information Act request, staff in the city of Ann Arbor’s attorney’s office put in 119.5 hours on the case just during that initial phase – through May 9.

Depending on how the court rules on the current pending motion, additional fees could be awarded.

Updated July 14, 2014: Wieder has filed a response on Dascola’s behalf opposing the Secretary of State’s motion to intervene. [.pdf of July 2014 response by Dascola] The city of Ann Arbor has filed a response concurring with the motion by the Secretary of State to be allowed as an intervening party. There’s also an update in the city’s response on the number of potentially disputed ballots:

As of the City Clerk’s receipt of the mail on July 14, 2014, there currently are only 12 first ballots remaining for which a second replacement ballot has not been received. Concerning the 12 remaining first ballots, 5 of these voters have indicated they will return the second replacement ballot and 1 of these voters indicated he would have his spouse return the replacement ballot. Only 3 first ballots have been received that appear to be dated after July 4, 2014. The ballots being returned are primarily the second replacement ballots. Of the 392 persons who received the second replacement ballots, 121 persons have already returned them. [.pdf of July 14, 2014 city of Ann Arbor motion]

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Judge Donald Shelton denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against the city of Ann Arbor’s footing drain disconnection ordinance.

Had it been granted, the motion would have prevented the city of Ann Arbor from enforcing its footing drain disconnection (FDD) ordinance. Shelton’s ruling came from the bench after a roughly 25-minute hearing held on July 2, 2014 at Washtenaw County’s 22nd circuit court at Huron and Main in downtown Ann Arbor.

Shelton appeared to reach his conclusion on the injunction fairly easily. But more than once during the hearing, he indicated that he had questions about the city’s legal position, reserving the possibility that the plaintiffs in the case could ultimately prevail after a full trial, which he expected would take place.

That has implications for the city’s motion for a summary disposition – a request for a decision from Shelton without a full trial. That motion was filed on June 9 and is on Shelton’s calendar for July 30. But at the conclusion of the July 2 hearing, after he’d ruled, Shelton told assistant city attorney Abigail Elias he’d begun a review of that motion for summary disposition and said, “I’ll just tell you that I think it is premature.” But he told Elias she could proceed as she liked.

Under the ordinance, property owners can be required to disconnect their footing drains from the city’s sanitary sewer system. The city has a program under which pre-approved contractors do the disconnection work and install the equipment, with the initial costs borne by the city.

Plaintiffs in the lawsuit contend that the city’s FDD ordinance amounts to inverse condemnation, a taking of property through physical occupation. They rely on the Loretto v. Teleprompter Supreme Court decision, which found that the required installation of a bracket for a cable television can be analyzed as an unconstitutional taking through physical occupation.

The criteria to be weighed in granting a preliminary injunction can include the merit of the actual case – the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail. And Shelton did touch on one aspect of the merits of the case, as he expressed skepticism about the public health, safety and welfare argument for the FDD ordinance. That skepticism was based on the fact that the city gives homeowners the option of making a $100 per month payment in lieu of a required footing drain disconnection. If it’s important to public health, safety and welfare, Shelton could not imagine that the city would say: Well, just give us some money and that will satisfy it.

But Shelton reserved most of his skepticism on July 2 for the idea that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction now. That’s because the plaintiffs in the case had their drains disconnected in 2002. If the plaintiffs had brought an action back in 2002, based on a desire not to comply, then that would have been a different situation, Shelton said. At that time, a motion for a preliminary injunction would have been to preserve the status quo – of not being yet disconnected from the sanitary sewer. “But now, more than a decade later, you come in and say: Undo the status quo while we have a trial!” He allowed the plaintiffs might well win at trial, adding that he didn’t know.

In ruling from the bench, Shelton reviewed the fact that the only question before him that day was the question of issuing a preliminary injunction. Circumstances under which the court can grant a preliminary injunction are limited, he said. “I’m going to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction.” He said he believed that the status quo would be disrupted by such an order, and he did not believe any significant irreparable harm would result from waiting until a full trial is held on the merits of the case.

History of the Lawsuit

The lawsuit was originally filed four months ago, on Feb. 27, in Washtenaw County’s 22nd circuit court. There it had been assigned to judge Donald Shelton. But on March 17, about two weeks after it was filed, the city removed the case from the state court to the federal district court in Detroit.

Then the plaintiffs in the case – Ann Arbor residents who had their footing drains disconnected from the sanitary sewer system under the city’s ordinance – filed a motion for remand back to the 22nd circuit court. At a hearing on May 28, 2014 in Detroit, federal judge Avern Cohn indicated that he’d be granting the motion for remand, which he subsequently did. That’s why the case is back in Washtenaw County’s 22nd circuit court.

Briefs filed in the case so far include the following:

• 02.27.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Complaint]
• 02.27.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Motion for Preliminary Injunction]
• 02.27.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Brief in Support of PI]
• 03.17.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Notice of Removal]
• 03.24.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Motion to Dismiss]
• 04.03.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Motion for Remand]
• 04.17.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Response to Motion for Remand]
• 04.24.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Reply to Response on Remand]
• 06.09.14 [Yu v. City of A2: Motion for Summary Disposition]
• 06.26.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Response to Motion for PI]

For background on the details of the case, see Chronicle coverage: “Lawsuit Filed on City Footing Drain Program” and “Backups: Lawyers, Sewers, Pumps.”

The city of Ann Arbor’s footing drain disconnection ordinance requires residents to disconnect their foundation footing drains from the sanitary sewer system. In broad strokes, the lawsuit is based on the idea that the city’s footing drain disconnection ordinance results in a physical occupation of a homeowner’s property – through installation of a sump and a pump – and that this amounts to inverse condemnation. Otherwise put, the contention by the plaintiffs is that enforcement of the city’s footing drain ordinance results in an unconstitutional taking of private property.

However, the July 2 hearing was on the plaintiff’s request that the court issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the city from enforcing the footing drain disconnection ordinance. So the arguments included a multi-pronged test the court is supposed to weigh in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction. From the plaintiff’s brief, those criteria include the likelihood of success on the merits of the claims, a balance of harms to plaintiffs and defendants in the absence of a preliminary injunction, whether plaintiffs have irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, whether injury to the plaintiff is of a continuous character, and whether the public interest is served.

The city’s response brief argues that before those criteria can be applied, a more basic condition needs to be satisfied. The response cites a Michigan Court of Appeals decision [Bratton v DAIIE (1983)] in support of that basic condition: “The object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, so that upon the final hearing the rights of the parties may be determined without injury to either. The status quo [that] will be preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”

The city’s response to the motion for preliminary injunction argues that the plaintiffs had their footing drains disconnected so long ago (11 and 12 years) that the status quo is clearly the current situation. The status quo, according to the city, is that the plaintiffs’ footing drains are not connected with the sanitary sewer system. The city also argues that the preliminary injunction would inappropriately grant the plaintiffs all the relief they are requesting, without a hearing on the merits of the case.

The city also argued in its brief that the elements of the standard multi-pronged test for preliminary injunctions are not satisfied, most importantly the irreparable harm criterion. The city argued that if the irreparable harm criterion is not satisfied, then the court need not even consider the question of a likelihood of success on the merits.

Plaintiffs in the case are John Boyer, Mary Jean Raab and Anita Yu. They are represented by attorneys Dan O’Brien, who’s chair of the litigation department at Woods Oviatt Gilman in Rochester, New York; Irvin Mermelstein, a local Ann Arbor attorney in private practice; and Mark Koroi, a Plymouth attorney. O’Brien argued the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

City attorney Stephen Postema attended the hearing. But arguing the city of Ann Arbor’s side at the hearing, opposing the motion for a preliminary injunction, was assistant city attorney Abigail Elias.

Detailed notes from the hearing are included below.

Arguments from the Plaintiff: Dan O’Brien

Dan O’Brien began by noting that the motion to be argued was for a preliminary injunction. The case itself was based on inverse condemnation resulting from the city of Ann Arbor’s footing drain disconnection program, he said. O’Brien stated that the case “begins and ends” with the Supreme Court decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Dan O’Brien.

O’Brien contended that the city of Ann Arbor’s position rests upon several misinterpretations of the applicable law. For example, O’Brien said, the city contends that the FDD is a regulatory taking and argues extensively based on that in its brief. The city urges the court to adopt the analysis in Penn Central Transit Co. v New York (1978) – which is essentially a balancing test based upon the nature and significance of the public interest that is served. The city, O’Brien said, apparently refuses to acknowledge that the installation of a sump pump and sump is a permanent physical occupation under a mandatory ordinance, which O’Brien contended is governed under the Loretto decision.

The two types of takings are mutually exclusive, O’Brien argued. If you have a physical invasion, that’s a special type of taking – and specifically that is not a regulatory taking. So a different standard applies, he continued, which is a part of the Supreme Court decision in the Loretto case.

O’Brien noted that the Loretto decision had been upheld on many occasions, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. U.S. (2012). O’Brien summarized that opinion as concluding that there are few bright lines in eminent domain jurisprudence – but one of them is that when a physical occupation takes place, that is a taking for which compensation must be paid, regardless of the significance or extent of the public interest being served.

O’Brien allowed that the law surrounding regulatory takings is complex, and involves identification and balancing of competing interests. The interests to be balanced include those of the government compared with the property owner. But permanent physical occupations, O’Brien argued, are quite simple and they involve no balancing of the public interest compared to the burden of the property owner. The Supreme Court could not have been more specific on that point, O’Brien said. He argued that a permanent physical occupation authorized by the government is in fact a taking – without regard to the public interest that it might serve.

Much of the city’s response brief, O’Brien contended, was dedicated to the facts surrounding the origin and derivation of the city’s FDD ordinance. O’Brien highlighted one claim the city has made about its FDD ordinance – that it has been successful in achieving its objectives. Without conceding whether the FDD ordinance had, in fact, achieved its objectives, O’Brien stated that the plaintiff’s position is that it’s not relevant whether the city has achieved its objectives. Under Loretto, he explained, effectiveness is not an issue. There was no dispute under Loretto, he said, that the bracket that was affixed to the building was effective in facilitating the distribution of cable television wires. But the effectiveness of that bracket did not matter to the court, he said.

Shelton then interrupted, telling O’Brien that the arguments he was making all go to the merits of the basic case, not the preliminary injunction. What about the other elements that you have to satisfy for a preliminary injunction? Shelton asked.

O’Brien responded with “I’m glad you asked that,” which earned an “I am, too!” from Shelton.

O’Brien then addressed the city’s argument in its brief that there was no hardship to the plaintiffs. O’Brien characterized the city’s position as follows: If there is any hardship, than it is overwhelmed by the hardship to the city of Ann Arbor that would result from granting the preliminary injunction.

O’Brien pointed out that affidavits had been submitted from the plaintiffs that outline the burdens they assumed as a result of the installation of the sumps and sump pumps in their homes. And the plaintiffs had done that under a mandatory ordinance, he said.

Shelton interjected: “But they have already done it.” O’Brien allowed that his clients had already done it. Shelton characterized it as strange – that O’Brien was asking for an injunction against something that his clients have already done. O’Brien invited Shelton to look at Exhibit 3 in the complaint – a document entitled “A Sump and Sump Pump Maintenance Manual.” O’Brien described Exhibit 3 as a 12- to 13-page document outlining what has to be done to maintain a sump pump, to test it, and the like.

Shelton interrupted: “It’s a sump pump, counsel! It’s a sump pump!” Shelton came back to the point that the motion was for a preliminary injunction. What he was being asked to do in that regard, Shelton said, was to disturb the status quo, not to preserve the status quo pending trial.

O’Brien responded to Shelton by saying he was asking Shelton to free his clients from the continuing burden of having to maintain and monitor their sump pumps. Shelton ventured that meant that O’Brien was asking him to change the status quo. Shelton stated that it would be a totally different situation, if the case had been brought before him in 2002 – as far as the question of preliminary injunction was concerned. By saying that, Shelton stressed, he was not addressing the merit of the lawsuit itself. O’Brien then connected his remarks to the parts of the city’s brief that indicated the request for preliminary injunction was actually the final relief that had been sought in the case. O’Brien said that was clearly not true – because they were asking for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and under Michigan law.

Shelton steered O’Brien back to the question of what Shelton was being asked to do that day. O’Brien told Shelton he was asking him to relieve his clients of the burden of having to continually maintain their sump pumps. Shelton ventured that it was a burden that O’Brien’s clients had voluntarily assumed. If O’Brien’s clients had brought an action back in 2002, based on a desire not to comply, then a motion for a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo at that time – of not being yet disconnected from the sanitary sewer – would be a different situation. “But now, more than a decade later, you come in and say: Undo the status quo while we have a trial!” Shelton said. The plaintiffs may well win at trial, he added, saying that he didn’t know yet.

O’Brien stressed that both Anita Yu and John Boyer have physical problems that make it difficult for them to fulfill the sump pump maintenance obligations, which are set forth in the maintenance manual. Anita Yu had wanted the sump pump installed in a specific location in her basement. But the contractor for her work – one of four contractors approved by the city – had installed it in her crawlspace. So it was essentially impossible for her to maintain the pump in that location. O’Brien described how the Boyers have had three different sump pumps, because they had to be replaced. Their house had flooded on several occasions and their basement had been damaged. That kind of occurrence had not ever happened before the FDD program had been implemented. O’Brien concluded that the ongoing and perpetual burden was not trivial.

Shelton pointed out that O’Brien’s clients had already assumed this burden. O’Brien responded by saying his clients continued to be forced to assume the burden and would continue to have to bear this burden without some kind of injunctive relief granted by the court. O’Brien told Shelton that he could see that Shelton was skeptical. Shelton agreed with O’Brien that he was skeptical about that specific aspect of the motion for a preliminary injunction. But Shelton stressed that he was not expressing anything about the merits of the rest of the case.

O’Brien invited Shelton to consider what the potential burden might be to the city that would result from granting the preliminary injunction. O’Brien was asking that his clients be relieved from the ongoing burden of having to continue to assume the maintenance obligations of the sump and the pump that was located in their basements. But there’s no proof of any hardship to the city, O’Brien said. The city had filed no affidavits from anyone with personal knowledge of the facts. O’Brien said it’s hard to imagine how the city would be burdened if the two homeowners who were his clients were freed from the burden of the FDD’s ongoing maintenance and repair obligations. The plaintiffs had submitted affidavits from people who were directly affected – which supported the motion for a preliminary injunction, he concluded. On the city’s side, there was nothing for Shelton to look at of an evidentiary nature, O’Brien argued.

The city makes an argument about a statute of limitations, O’Brien continued. He argued that other cases established that the statute of limitations is clearly 15 years – when there is a taking and the plaintiff still has title to the property. So O’Brien rejected any argument that there is only a three- or a six-year statute of limitations, saying such arguments “don’t hold water.”

In support of its position, O’Brien contended, the city talks about status quo and the fact that there was a consent order with the Michigan Department of Environment Quality. But the city had not told the court that the consent order was not in place until after the footing drain disconnects of the plaintiffs. So the administrative consent order was not a factor in justifying the footing drain disconnection ordinance for either Anita Yu or John Boyer. And secondly, the city had not told the court that the consent order had been terminated, O’Brien said. But in fact it had been terminated in November 2009.

O’Brien was granted permission to approach the bench, and handed Shelton a copy of the termination order. The status quo today, O’Brien said, was that the administrative consent order was not in force. With respect to enforcement of continuing the FDD program, that administrative consent order simply does not exist, he concluded. Shelton did not seem impressed with the termination document for the administrative consent order, laughing, “This is because they [the city] complied!” Shelton continued by saying the city had complied by having people stop putting stormwater into the sanitary sewer.

O’Brien came back to his first point regarding the administrative consent order – that it was not the administrative consent order under which the city enforced the FDD program with respect to his clients, because his clients’ disconnects had taken place before the administrative consent order was agreed to. Shelton allowed that he had understood O’Brien’s point, but ventured that wasn’t really the point that O’Brien wanted to make. O’Brien said the point was this: To the extent there’s any ongoing responsibility for his clients because of the consent order, that’s a non sequitur.

About the issue of irreparable harm, O’Brien said, it’s the fact that his clients have to live with this burden. O’Brien referred to Shelton’s remark that “It’s just a sump pump.” It’s more than that, O’Brien argued: It’s the fact that the plaintiffs have to buy battery backups, which are not paid for by the city, and they have to replace the sump pumps, because apparently the pumps don’t have a very long lifespan. It’s also the fact that they’re constantly in fear of the sump pumps not working and their basements flooding. Flooding has happened and this had damaged their basements and made parts of their basements unusable, O’Brien said.

There’s no peace of mind for his clients, O’Brien said, as a result of the implementation of the city’s FDD ordinance. Before the ordinance was implemented, they never had any drainage problems at all, O’Brien said, “not a drop of water in their basement.” To minimize this burden, or to say it’s not ongoing or to characterize it as the status quo, overlooks the fact that his clients are people who are retired and not able to sustain the burden that has been imposed upon them, O’Brien said. Clearly what’s happened is a physical invasion of their property, he said. And the Loretto case states that this is a taking without just compensation, regardless of the public benefit that is being served, O’Brien concluded.

Arguments from the City: Abigail Elias

Arguing for the city, Abigail Elias began by noting that the motion before the court that day was the motion for a preliminary injunction – which is characterized by a form of extraordinary relief, she said. Based on the arguments made by the plaintiffs, she ventured that the plaintiffs actually seemed to be addressing a motion for summary disposition as opposed to a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Elias reviewed the key point from the city’s brief – that the primary point of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm. She contended that the plaintiffs hadn’t identified any imminent irreparable harm that would result from a change in the status quo.

Assistant city attorney Abigail Elias.

What the plaintiffs were really asking for, she contended, was in the conclusion to their brief – that the court declare invalid the city’s footing drain disconnection ordinance, and stop the city from enforcing it. That kind of relief is not specific to the plaintiffs, she said. And it’s not relief that will prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiffs specifically. And the plaintiffs cannot represent other parties who are not before the court, she continued. Elias noted that other parties in the city might have a different point of view than the plaintiffs with respect to the ordinance. Based on the lack of imminent irreparable harm, Elias told Shelton that she did not think she really needed to argue any further.

However, Elias had considered the arguments on the merits – the likelihood of success. Elias contended that the plaintiffs had ignored the part of the Loretto case that points out the regulations that require installation of instruments and equipment into a property are not takings. This is not a case where the city has authorized a third-party to install anything in the house, she said. And this is not a situation where the city has installed something that occupies someone’s house, she said.

At that, Shelton expressed some skepticism: “Wellll, if you tell them that they gotta install a sump pump, and these are the only people who are approved to install it, what’s the difference?” Elias stated that through disconnecting the footing drains, homeowners are bringing their property into compliance with the current building code.

Elias then began to argue based on health, safety and welfare. But Shelton told her that argument that the FDD ordinance is essential to ensure health, safety and welfare is “sort of undercut” by the fact that a property owner can give the city some money and avoid it. If it’s important to public health, safety and welfare, Shelton could not imagine that the city would say: Well, just give us some money and that will satisfy it. Elias replied that the effect of the city’s $100-per-month policy was that two property owners had opted for that route, as opposed to disconnecting and installing a sump and pump.

Shelton then adduced a saying from his fishing partner: It’s not the principle of the thing, it’s the money. But he always told his fishing partner that “in court, it’s all about the principle of the thing.” It doesn’t matter how many people have opted to pay the money, Shelton said. The principle of the thing is the city can’t rely on an argument of health, safety and welfare when the city says a homeowner can “buy out of it.”

Elias told Shelton that when sewage backups occur, the city does provide sanitation and clean-up services – for example, if the plaintiffs were to undo their disconnects and the city were faced with increasing backups either in their own homes or in their neighbors’ homes. The point Elias eventually made was that the city does put the $100-per-month cost, paid by the two property owners, toward the operation of the sewage system.

Shelton told Elias that he was disturbed by the idea of the $100-per-month payment as it related to the merits of the case. He told Elias he was familiar enough with the concept – that the whole idea is to keep stormwater out of the sanitary sewer, because it costs a lot of money to treat sewage and you shouldn’t be spending that money and that effort at your sewage treatment plant on stormwater. “I’m with you on all of that, until you say, ‘But you can buy out of that.’ There is a disconnect there, to me,” Shelton said. How does that jibe with the idea that you can buy your way out of it? he asked. How does a few extra dollars address that human health issue?

Elias said that if the cost had been something like $10 a month, that would be different. She did not think now was the time to address the calculation of $100. But $1,200 a year is a significant amount for an individual: It’s designed as an incentive, she said. Shelton asked her if the city used that money to increase the capacity of the sewage treatment plant. Elias said the money goes into the funds that are used to operate the system, and into the funds used to clean up basements when there are incidents with sanitary sewer backups. So the money paid to the city is used to address issues that are being addressed otherwise by the footing disconnect program.

Shelton told Elias he didn’t mean to get sidetracked on this issue of the merits of the case. But he wanted to let her know there are some questions about the city’s position on the merits. He was more concerned, for the purposes of that day’s hearing, about the irreparable harm issue. “There’s going to be a trial at some point in this case. The only issue .. before me today is what happens between now and that trial.”

Elias then addressed O’Brien’s comments about the administrative consent order. She explained that the plaintiffs’ disconnections were included as part of the count that the city was required to achieve to satisfy the order, even though they were done before the order was signed. Elias also pointed out that Michigan’s Home Rule City Act was amended in 2002. And that was done specifically to authorize an ordinance such as the city’s, which requires private property disconnects and separation of storm and sanitary systems. So the city’s footing drain disconnect program was authorized by state law, Elias contended.

It also helps the city comply with its obligations under the federal Clean Water Act, she said. The city of Ann Arbor had not threatened to shut off people’s water, like Hickory Hills did, for individuals who did not disconnect their footing drains from the sanitary sewer. “Ann Arbor, being a kinder, gentler city,” she quipped, figured that the extra $100 a month would be at least as good an incentive, without that kind of threat.

Elias contended that no harm would come to the plaintiffs beyond their existing status quo. The risk, if the plaintiffs’ connections were restored, would be possible backups in their neighbors’ basements. Elias concluded her remarks by saying that she did not think the plaintiffs had met the requirements for a preliminary injunction.

Ruling: Shelton

In ruling from the bench, Shelton reviewed the fact that the only question before him that day was the question of issuing a preliminary injunction.

Judge Donald Shelton.

Circumstances under which the court can grant a preliminary injunction are limited, he said. “I’m going to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction.” He said he believed that the status quo would be disrupted by such an order, and did not believe any significant irreparable harm would result from waiting until a full trial is held on the merits of the case.

Shelton indicated that he had seen the filing by the city for a summary disposition and he had begun to review it. “I’ll just tell you that I think it is premature,” he said. But he added that Elias could proceed as she’d like.

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In the June 6, 2014 filing, attorney Tom Wieder has asked that the court award him fees for 93.25 hours of work at $400 per hour for a total of $37,300. Another $425.50 in costs for filings and document retrieval from the PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) system brings the total amount the city would owe to $37,725.50.

The 93.25 hours of work is itemized in 57 specific increments in spans of time ranging from 15 minutes to 9.75 hours. The number of hours is argued in the supporting brief to be reasonable based on the complexity of the case and the fact that Wieder was Dascola’s sole counsel.

The argument for the hourly rate is based on various standards cited in the accompanying brief, which include the quality of the results obtained for the client, and the reasonableness of the rate based on Wieder’s experience, skill, and reputation. [.pdf of motion for fees and accompanying brief]

It had previously been postponed at the council’s May 5, 2014 meeting, to be taken up again on June 2. During the postponement, the dollar amount of the contract extension had been reduced from $748,106 to $143,440. That reflects a reduction in the scope of the work. The original May 5 resolution called for the following activities to be funded: citizen support ($36,928); FDD citizens advisory committee meetings ($24,180); information management for sump pump monitors ($93,707); developer offset mitigation (DOM) program support; ($95,213); and multi-family FDD implementation ($498,005).

No longer a part of the scope of work in the approved June 2 resolution were the FDD citizens advisory committee meetings, information management, or the multi-family FDD implementation. The revised memo describes how the funding would only provide a bridge until recommendations from a study group have been received, which will determine the future of the FDD program:

This amendment would provide the services needed to bridge the gap until the SSWWE [Sanitary Sewer Wet Weather Evaluation] Project recommendations have been made. Presently, the anticipated timeline for completion of the SSWWE Project is in the autumn of 2014. That does not allow sufficient time to issue a new RFP, collect and review proposals, award a contract, and bring a new consultant up to speed to manage the remaining FDD and DOM work outlined above. Existing City staff does not currently have the available resources or expertise to perform the inspections required for the DOM program.

Details on the council’s June 2 deliberations are provided in The Chronicle’s live updates filed during the meeting.

By way of additional background, in 2012 the city’s program to disconnect footing drains from the sanitary sewer system was suspended by the council in some areas of the city. Specifically, it was suspended in the Glen Leven and Morehead (Lansdowne neighborhood) areas. The program was allowed to continue in other geographic areas and as part of the city’s developer offset mitigation (DOM) program. The DOM requires owners of new developments to complete a certain number of FDDs to offset the additional flow in the sanitary system caused by new construction.

The CDM contract drew scrutiny at the May 5 meeting because the city is currently undertaking a sanitary sewer wet weather evaluation (SSWWE) study. It’s supposed to yield a recommendation about whether to continue with the FDD program, and if so, in what form. In addition, the city’s ordinance – which requires property owners to undertake FDDs – was challenged in a lawsuit filed earlier this year. That case is pending as the city first removed the case from state to federal court. But the result of a May 28 hearing before a federal judge will be to return the case to the Washtenaw County 22nd circuit court.

The previous three iterations of the CDM contract totaled  about $3.6 million. The money for these contracts is drawn from the city’s sewer fund.

The proposed contract extension drew criticism during public commentary on May 5 from Frank Burdick, a Ward 4 resident who urged the council to reject it. Burdick spoke again during public commentary on June 2, and again advocated for rejecting the contract.

Since the FDD program’s start in 2001, about 1,834 footing drains have been disconnected through the city program and 848 footing drains have been disconnected through the developer offset mitigation program.

Animation of contrast between the pre-FDD configuration and the post-FDD configuration. (Original illustration from screenshots of YouTube video by Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, modified by The Chronicle.)

This brief was filed from the city council’s chambers on the second floor of city hall, located at 301 E. Huron.

Theodore Levin U.S. Courthouse in downtown Detroit.

The lawsuit had originally been filed against the city three months ago, on Feb. 27, in Washtenaw County’s 22nd circuit court. There it had been assigned to judge Donald Shelton. On March 17, about two weeks after it was filed, the city removed the case from the state court to the federal court.

But the plaintiffs in the case – Ann Arbor residents who had their footing drains disconnected from the sanitary sewer system under the city’s ordinance – filed a motion for remand back to the 22nd circuit court. At the Wednesday hearing, Cohn indicated that he’d be granting the motion for remand.

By way of background, the ordinance that’s being challenged was enacted in 2001. It establishes a program under which property owners can be required to disconnect their footing drains from the city’s sanitary sewer system. Its intent is to diminish the risk of sanitary overflows into the Huron River and of sanitary sewage backups in homeowners’ basements.

The lawsuit – Yu v. City of Ann Arbor – claims the city’s FDD ordinance violates: (1) the Michigan state law setting forth requirements for a government to take private property for public use; (2) the Michigan state constitutional prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation; (3) the corresponding U.S. constitutional prohibition against taking private property, which is a Fifth Amendment claim; and (4) the prohibition against violating the federally protected rights of others, which is a claim under 42 U.S. Code Section 1983.

In broad strokes, Cohn summarized all of the plaintiffs’ claims against the city as reducible to claims about inverse condemnation – taking of private property without just compensation. The plaintiffs contend that the city’s ordinance requiring disconnection of footing drains from the sanitary sewer system – and its associated installation of a sump with a pump – is a physical occupation of a homeowner’s property with equipment not belonging to the homeowner.

Inverse condemnation is a kind of claim for which remedies in the state courts must first be exhausted, before moving to federal court. And although the complaint cites federal law in its causes of action, Cohn was not willing to sever the state claims from the federal claims or to stay the federal claims in the complaint.

Because all the claims were about inverse condemnation, Cohn said, “All I know is that I don’t have subject matter jurisdiction until there’s an exhaustion of remedies under state law. I’m going to have to remand it – I can’t keep it. The only way they can exhaust their remedies is in Washtenaw County circuit court.”

Cohn made his position so clear in his initial remarks that the plaintiffs’ counsel – Dan O’Brien of Woods Oviatt Gilman in Rochester, New York – was initially content not to offer oral argument: “I’ll rely on my papers, your honor.”

So assistant city attorney Abigail Elias, who represented the city at the May 28 hearing, was arguing before a judge who’d essentially already indicated how he would rule. She still made a bid to convince Cohn at least to dismiss the federal claims without prejudice, if he was going to remand the state claims back to the circuit court. She opened her remarks by saying, “I understand generally it’s an uphill battle…” but Cohn interrupted, “Not generally. Specifically.”

In the course of the short hearing, Cohn was not generous in his assessment of the city’s legal briefs that had been filed, calling them “jurisprudential legerdemain.”

For previous Chronicle coverage, see “Lawsuit Filed on City Footing Drain Program” and “Backups: Lawyers, Sewers, Pumps.”

The hearing is reported below in more detail.

May 28, 2014 Hearing

Plaintiffs in the case are Ann Arbor residents John Boyer, Mary Jean Raab and Anita Yu. They are represented by attorneys Dan O’Brien, who’s chair of the litigation department at Woods Oviatt Gilman in Rochester, New York; Irvin Mermelstein, a local Ann Arbor attorney in private practice; and Mark Koroi, a Plymouth attorney. All three attorneys attended the hearing. O’Brien handled the oral argument.

Representing the city of Ann Arbor at the hearing was assistant city attorney Abigail Elias.

The hearing was before federal judge Avern Cohn of the U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan. Cohn was appointed to the bench during the Carter administration in 1979, and assumed senior status in the federal court system in 1999.

May 28,2014 Hearing: Proceedings

The hearing began at 2:15 p.m. as Cohn told the parties: “I’ve read your papers and I’ve read the complaint carefully.” He commented on the “amount of paper” that’s been generated in this case, and ticked through the seven causes of action in the complaint. He noted that some of the causes of action weren’t really causes of action – for example, a request for declaratory relief. But Cohn summarized them all as arising from one basic cause of action under the Michigan constitution: The plaintiffs were making inverse condemnation claims, Cohn concluded.

All of these claims can be adjudicated in state court – because there is a remedy for the claims under state law, Cohn said. If the plaintiffs prevail under state law, he added, “that’s the end of it. Under Williamson, the case doesn’t belong here.”

By way of background, the Williamson case Cohn cited in his remarks was a Supreme Court case – Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985). It held that inverse condemnation cases are not appropriate for federal review until there is a final determination in state court.

Cohn then commented on the briefs filed in the case by the city of Ann Arbor, calling them “jurisprudential legerdemain.”

After ending his commentary, Cohn gave attorneys on both sides the chance to respond. When asked if he wanted to address the court, plaintiffs’ counsel Dan O’Brien told Cohn: “I’ll rely on my papers, your honor.”

Abigail Elias, representing the city of Ann Arbor, then stepped to the podium to address the court. “I understand generally it’s an uphill battle…” but Cohn interrupted, “Not generally. Specifically.”

Elias cited England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs (1964) in support of her contention that the court had an obligation to adjudicate the federal claims over which it has jurisdiction. The plaintiffs had not made an “England reservation” with the state court, Elias said. “That troubles me,” she added.

By way of background, the federal practice manual for legal aid attorneys from the Shriver Center characterizes an “England reservation” as follows:

An express England reservation has three elements: (1) explicit expression to the state tribunal of an intent to return to federal court in the wake of an adverse state determination, if any; (2) explicit notification to the state tribunal of the federal questions that would be reserved, and (3) an absence of voluntary litigation in the state court by the reserving party of the federal questions that would be preserved for federal trial.

Elias suggested that the federal claims in the Yu v. City of Ann Arbor case could be dismissed by Cohn without prejudice.

Cohn, who’d been shaking his head in disagreement while Elias spoke, told her that he wouldn’t sever the state claims from the federal claims – and he wouldn’t stay the federal claims. If the plaintiffs want to assert federal claims in state court, they can try to do that. Regarding the claims of inverse condemnation, the federal court doesn’t have subject matter jurisdiction, he said, until the plaintiffs have exhausted all remedies under state law.

Theoretically, Cohn noted, he could remand the state claims and stay the federal claims. But he hadn’t seen cases where that had been done. “I’m going to have to remand it – I can’t keep it,” Cohn said. The only way that the plaintiffs can exhaust their remedies is in Washtenaw County circuit court, he said.

O’Brien then spoke briefly. This case, O’Brien said, is “on all fours” with another recent case handled by the same court [Oakland 40, LLC v. City of South Lyon (2011)]. In that case, an inverse condemnation claim had been removed from the state court to the federal court, and the federal court had granted a motion for remand back to the state court. “The same thing should happen here,” O’Brien said. The plaintiffs had not brought the case in federal court because of Williamson, he noted.

Elias then appeared to attempt to secure a clarification about whether the plaintiffs were in fact pleading involuntary servitude – a federal claim. Cohn told Elias he didn’t see such a pleading in the briefs. Elias contended such a claim seemed to be present in the complaint – in a reference to homeowners having to work without pay [to maintain their sump pumps].

Cohn then told Elias that when the case was remanded to state court, the city of Ann Arbor could move to dismiss the federal claims. Cohn said he didn’t know why the plaintiffs had chosen to plead the federal causes of action. Cohn said he read the complaint as about inverse condemnation “and nothing more.”

The hearing, which lasted about 11 minutes, ended at 2:26 p.m.

Briefs Filed

Briefs filed in the case so far include the following:

• 02.27.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Complaint]
• 02.27.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Motion for Preliminary Injunction]
• 03.17.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Notice of Removal]
• 03.24.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Motion to Dismiss]
• 04.03.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Motion for Remand]
• 04.17.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Response to Motion for Remand]
• 04.24.14 [.pdf of Yu v. City of A2: Reply to Response on Remand]

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At his downtown barbershop, shortly after getting the news that the court had ruled in his favor, Bob Dascola showed The Chronicle photos of himself as a clown participating in Ann Arbor’s Fourth of July parade – something he has done for several years. He will be participating again this year – also as a clown, not as a city council candidate, because he’s already registered his parade entry that way.

At issue were city charter durational requirements on voter registration and residency – that require city councilmembers to be registered to vote in the city and to be a resident of the ward they want to represent for at least a year prior to taking office.

Dascola contended he met the residency requirement, but conceded that he fell short of the voter registration requirement. He did not register to vote in the city until Jan. 15, 2014. Dascola submitted sufficient signatures to qualify, so the impact of the ruling is that Dascola will appear on the Ward 3 ballot.

Dascola was represented in the case by local attorney Tom Wieder.

Both of the Ann Arbor city charter requirements were ruled unconstitutional, null and void in federal cases from the early 1970s. But the city of Ann Arbor sought to enforce those charter requirements against Dascola based on subsequent decisions on eligibility requirements in other jurisdictions in the intervening period. Those included an Ann Arbor case in 2002 (Wojack v. City of Ann Arbor) that resulted in a finding by the local state circuit court upholding the residency requirement. But that finding came only after Republican Scott Wojack was allowed on the Ward 1 city council ballot – a race he did not win. Wojack’s attorney was Tom Wieder.

Based on subsequent case law and a shifted standard of judicial review, one-year durational requirements of the kind that the Ann Arbor city charter includes would almost certainly be found constitutional, if the 1970s cases were to be litigated today. But the May 20, 2014 ruling by Zatkoff found Dascola’s argument convincing: That in order for the city to enforce the charter requirements – which had been found unconstitutional, null and void in separate rulings in 1971 – it would have needed to re-enact those requirements.

From the opinion: “Plaintiff [Dascola] has provided compelling evidence that Defendants [the city of Ann Arbor] have used void provisions of the Charter in an attempt to preclude him from running for City Council. Further, remedies available at law would not compensate Plaintiff for his inability to run for City Council. Finally, as established above, the balance of hardships between the parties – and the public interest at large – warrant this Court enjoining Defendants from enforcing a void law when the City has failed to re-enact that law.” [Dascola v. City of A2: Opinion] [Dascola v. City of A2: Judgment]

That means all the Aug. 5, 2014 ballots for partisan primaries for Ann Arbor mayor and city council are finally set. On the non-partisan side, Bryan Kelly took out petitions for city council in Ward 1, but was informed by the city that he did not meet the charter’s durational eligibility requirements. The ruling on the Dascola case would clear the way for Kelly to run. And as an independent, he’d have until July 17 to submit signatures. But in responding to an emailed Chronicle query, he indicated that he’s content with the representation of Ward 1 on the city council, saying they are “good people,” and he is no longer contemplating running at this time.

The city does have the option to appeal the ruling, but council sources indicate that is not probable. More likely is that the council would vote to place a charter amendment on the ballot this fall so that voters could ratify some set of eligibility requirements. The May 20 ruling from Zatkoff permanently enjoins the city from enforcing either of the former charter requirements prior to re-enacting them.

The background of the case and a review of the opinion are presented below, as well as the complete set of briefings from the case.

Ann Arbor City Charter Durational Requirements

The words printed in the Ann Arbor city charter include two types of one-year durational requirements for city council candidates: voter registration in the city, and residency in the ward they seek to represent. From the Ann Arbor city charter [emphasis added]:

Eligibility for City Office – General Qualifications
Section 12.2. Except as otherwise provided in this charter, a person is eligible to hold a City office if the person has been a registered elector of the City, or of territory annexed to the City or both, and, in the case of a Council Member, a resident of the ward from which elected, for at least one year immediately preceding election or appointment. This requirement may be waived as to appointive officers by resolution concurred in by not less than seven members of the Council.

The Complaint: Feld and HRP

Dascola contended he has lived in Ward 3 since about Sept. 15, 2012, but he allowed that he did not register to vote in the city of Ann Arbor until Jan. 15, 2014. So according to Dascola, he met the residency requirement but did not meet the voter registration requirement.

Ann Arbor’s residency requirement was struck down in federal court as unconstitutional in January 1972 [Feld v. City of Ann Arbor]. The voter registration requirement was struck down in March of the same year [HRP v. City of Ann Arbor].

Dascola’s complaint was based on findings by the U.S. District Court in both the Feld and the HRP cases that the durational requirements were null and void. From Dascola’s complaint: “Neither the Feld, nor the Human Rights Party, decision was appealed, nor has either been overruled, vacated or modified in any way.” [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Complaint]

Dascola’s Request for Summary Judgment

Immediately after filing the complaint, Dascola’s attorney Tom Wieder filed a motion for summary judgment – asking the court to find in Dascola’s favor without a full trial. The brief makes essentially the same arguments in the initial complaint: The city’s charter requirements were ruled unconstitutional in Feld and HRP.

From the motion for summary judgment: “The Defendants [city of Ann Arbor] are improperly and illegally relying and acting upon one or more former provisions of the City Charter which are void and of no effect and, in so doing, are depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional right to seek elective office, as well as depriving the electors of the Third Ward of their right to vote for Plaintiff.” [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion for Summary Judgment]

The part of the argument on which the ruling in Dascola’s case eventually turned is the idea that once charter provisions have been explicitly ruled unconstitutional and declared null and void – as in Feld and HRP – they are not merely dormant, possibly to be awakened, but rather do not exist at all, and it’s as if they’d never been written. The brief cites a body of Michigan case law in support of that notion.

City’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment

The city’s response to the motion for summary judgment included a potential factual dispute. The city pointed out that in spite of Dascola’s claim that he has resided in Ward 3 since about Sept. 15, 2012, he didn’t change his voter registration or driver’s license to an Ann Arbor address until Jan. 15, 2014. And when Dascola filed an application on Dec. 1, 2013 to be appointed to the city’s pedestrian safety task force, he gave a Grass Lake address as his home address and marked “No” on the application’s question about city of Ann Arbor residency. [.pdf of Dascola's application to the pedestrian safety task force]

The application was included as an exhibit in the city’s brief. But the brief does not appear to mention that in the same application, Dascola seems to indicate a habitual lodging at the Baldwin Avenue address in Ward 3, where he contends he’s been a resident since Sept. 15, 2012: “I walk to work every day from Stadium and Packard area and have to use crosswalk at Baldwin. I have witnessed an accident because a driver wasn’t paying attention and was almost hit by car.”

Under Michigan election law, for purposes of voting and registration, habitual lodging is one way to determine residency:

168.11 “Residence” defined.
Sec. 11. (1) ”Residence”, as used in this act, for registration and voting purposes means that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging. If a person has more than 1 residence, or if a person has a residence separate from that of his or her spouse, that place at which the person resides the greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act. This section does not affect existing judicial interpretation of the term residence.

Also supporting Dascola’s contention of residency at the Baldwin address for a year before the 2014 election was his application for renewal of his barber’s license on Aug. 8, 2013, which gives his Baldwin address. [.pdf of Dascola's barber's license renewal] The city’s response to the motion for summary judgment does not appear to include the barber’s license renewal.

Factual issues aside, the city’s legal position, as conveyed in the response to the motion for summary judgment, is that the Feld and HRP decisions from the early 1970s are no longer the controlling law in the matter. Among the decisions the city contends should be used to judge the current case is a 2002 Washtenaw County circuit court case [Wojack v. City of Ann Arbor opinion], which relied nearly exclusively on a 1981 federal court decision [Joseph v City of Birmingham (ED Mich 1981)].

The Wojack case involved Republican candidate Scott Wojack, who sought to run for Ward 1 city council. Wojack met the voter registration requirement – because he’d been registered to vote in the city for more than a year – but did not meet the ward residency requirement, because he’d moved, within the city, to Ward 1 under a year before the election. Wojack was allowed to appear on the ballot, but lost the election. The Wojack decision, upholding the Ann Arbor city charter’s durational residency requirement, came after the election.

Also among the cases that the city of Ann Arbor wanted the court to use in deciding Dascola’s lawsuit was a Detroit case from 2013 [Barrow v Detroit Election Commission]. That involved a challenge by Tom Barrow to the eligibility of Mike Duggan to appear on the ballot for mayor, because Duggan did not meet Detroit’s one-year durational voter registration requirement. One wrinkle in the Barrow case is that the Detroit requirement dates from the time of filing petitions, not the date of election. Duggan was ultimately ruled ineligible, even though he would have been eligible if he had waited a few days to file his petitions [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion for SJ].

Dascola’s Reply to City’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment

Dascola’s reply to the city’s response to the motion for summary judgment reviewed much of the ground covered previously.

The argument on which the case could possibly turn was reiterated: The idea that once charter provisions have been explicitly ruled unconstitutional and declared null and void – as in Feld and HRP – they are not merely dormant, possibly to be awakened, but rather do not exist at all, and it’s as if they’d never been written. A second part of that argument is to question by what orderly process charter provisions could be revived – whatever it is, the contention is that the city had not followed one [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply in Support of Motion for SJ].

Other Motions, Briefs

The city also filed a motion to dismiss along with a supporting brief. That got a response from Dascola and a reply from the city. Much of the material in those briefs covered ground also addressed in the briefs on the motion for summary judgment.

Zatkoff also ordered supplemental briefs that were to focus exclusively on the question: If a law is found “unconstitutional and void” by a federal district court, must that law be officially re-enacted before it is enforced?

All of those briefs are included in the complete set of briefs in the final section of this report.

Opinion: Finding for Dascola

The first four pages of Zatkoff’s 17-page opinion recite the historical background of the case. One highlight from that description is Zatkoff’s characterization of the status of the Feld and HRP decisions [emphasis added]:

Both parties agree that neither the Feld nor Human Rights Party decisions were appealed by the City. Further, neither party argues that the Feld and Human Rights Party decisions were ever explicitly overruled, vacated, or modified; indeed, these decisions have never been reviewed or reversed, and thus remain intact.

The analysis section begins with the controlling question on which Zatkoff had asked the parties to file supplemental briefs: If a law is found “unconstitutional and void” by a federal district court, must that law be officially re-enacted before it is enforced?

Zatkoff concludes that on both sides, much of the briefing material that had been submitted had no relevance to that controlling point. About the city’s argument that the charter requirements are, in fact, constitutional, Zatkoff states: “Deciding the constitutionality of the language contained in Section 12.2 of the Charter as if it had been passed today is not the question before the Court.” The opinion continues by noting that the Wojack decision was also not relevant to the question to be decided.

In evaluating the arguments on the basic question, Zatkoff concludes: “Additionally, the Court has not found – nor has either party presented – a case from any circuit indicating that a law found unconstitutional and void that remains intact need not be re-enacted prior to enforcement.”

Zatkoff analyzes three of the city’s arguments, as put forward by city attorney Stephen Postema. First, the city contended that the Feld and HRP decisions did not “repeal” the Ann Arbor city charter requirements, but rather found them null and void – as “repealing” a charter requirement was something that only a city could do through a legislative process under Michigan’s Home Rule City Act. The judiciary was not empowered to “repeal” a charter requirement, the city argued. Zatkoff rejected that argument, saying:

Furthermore, Defendants’ argument is premised on the flawed notion that the term “void” is materially different than “repeal,” and that the only way a law may become unenforceable is if the law is officially “repealed.” The 4th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary defines “void” as “[n]ull; ineffectual, nugatory; having no legal force or binding effect; unable, in law, to support the purpose for which it was intended.” Regardless of the definition of “repeal,” this definition of “void” demonstrates that the intent behind the Feld and Human Rights Party decisions was to give the Charter provisions “no legal force or binding effect.”

The city’s next argument analyzed by Zatkoff is one based on the idea that a federal court order applies only to the plaintiff in a particular case: “By arguing that prior federal court orders are only effective for the plaintiff(s) in those cases, Defendants are incorrectly attempting to apply a rule exclusively based on the Declaratory Judgment Act to all decisions made by federal courts.”

The argument is fatally flawed, Zatkoff concludes, because, it creates an “individual challenge” requirement, which would be inconsistent with the basic principles of the federal judicial system. Those basic principles include one expressed in Marbury v. Madison from 1803: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” The city of Ann Arbor’s argument “seeks to destroy this pillar of the legal system,” Zatkoff writes.

Zatkoff then characterizes the city’s position as reserving for itself to say what the law is:

The Court is deeply troubled by this proposition. First, the Defendants fail to indicate any authority granting the City the power to say “what the law is.” Further, the Defendants have provided no indication as to when exactly these voided provisions of the Charter “became” constitutional again. Additionally, the Defendants provided no evidence that notice as to “what the law is” was ever given to the public. In sum, the Defendants have provided absolutely no authority as to why this Court should simply abandon the basic principles of law that have formed the foundation of the United States legal structure for over two hundred years. The Court refuses to do so at this time.

The order from the court permanently enjoins the city from enforcing the city charter eligibility requirements – unless they are re-enacted. That means the council will need to put those or some different requirements before voters to enact – if the city of Ann Arbor wants to be able to enforce eligibility requirements on elected officials.

In explaining why he is issuing a writ of mandamus, Zatkoff points to the city’s failure to follow the federal court’s orders in the HRP and Feld cases:

Additionally, taking into consideration the Defendants’ demonstrated inability (or unwillingness) to follow the explicit orders issued by federal courts with regards to the constitutionality of the provisions at issue, the Court finds that issuing a writ of mandamus is necessary to guarantee Plaintiff receives the relief to which he is entitled.

Briefs

Here are links to .pdf files of the briefs and opinion:

• 03.28.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Complaint]
• 03.29.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion for Summary Judgment]
• 04.14.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion to Dismiss]
  
• 04.14.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion for SJ]
• 04.18.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply in Support of Motion for SJ]
• 04.18.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion to Dismiss]
• 04.23.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply to Response to Motion to Dismiss]
• 05.06.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief]
• 05.06.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Defendant's Supplemental Brief]
• 05.08.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint]
• 05.09.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion for Leave to File AC]
• 05.11.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply to Response to Motion for Leave]
• 05.20.14 [.pdf of Dascola v. City of A2: Opinion]
• 05.20.14 [.pdf of Dascola v. City of A2: Judgment]

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On May 6, 2014, the final court-ordered supplemental briefs were submitted by both sides in the lawsuit, filed by Bob Dascola against the city of Ann Arbor. Dascola contends he’s an eligible candidate and wants the court to order that he be placed on the ballot in the Ward 3 city council Democratic primary. He would join Julie Grand and Samuel McMullen in that election, which will be held on Aug. 5, 2014.

But as the electorate awaits a ruling from federal judge Lawrence Zatkoff, the two sides have continued to lather up. Late last week, Tom Wieder – the attorney for Dascola – filed a motion asking permission from the court to file an amended complaint. The motion for leave to file the amendment describes the nature of the amendments as clarifying the precise source of rights that Dascola is seeking to enforce in his lawsuit [the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and his rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983], and to clarify the basis of the claim for attorney fees, if Dascola wins. The motion contends that the changes to the complaint are minimal and raise no new legal or factual issues. On its face, the motion appears intended to ensure that Wieder can be paid, if Dascola were to prevail.

However, in responding to the motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Ann Arbor city attorney Stephen Postema offers a cutting characterization. He calls it ”procedurally odd” and accuses Wieder of failing to exercise due diligence in filing the motion. In addition, Postema responds to arguments made in Wieder’s supplemental brief, on the substance of the lawsuit. The substantial issue raised by the lawsuit involves the status of laws – like the city’s charter durational residency and voter registration requirements – when those laws have been found to be unconstitutional, null and void by a federal court.

Wieder responded in kind to the city’s brief, writing that the city does the following:

1) Misrepresent the nature of the proposed Amendment; 2) Misrepresent authority on the issue of futility and its applicability to this case; 3) Continue its fabricated argument that Plaintiff claims Charter Section 12.2 was “repealed” by the Feld and HRP decisions; 4) Produce and present to the Court what is, essentially, a Response Brief to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief, although none was called for by the Court’s Order; and 5) Present a fanciful “parade of horribles” that will befall the Court, the candidates, “possible donors and supporters,” the public and the Defendants if the Amendment is allowed.

By way of background, Ann Arbor’s city charter includes two durational requirements for city councilmembers – that they be registered voters in the city for a year before election, and that they be residents of the ward they seek to represent for a year before election.

Dascola contends that he meets the residency requirement. He allows that he does not meet the voter registration requirement. But Dascola’s core legal claim is that the two charter provisions were struck down as unconstitutional, null and void in federal court cases dating from the 1970s. The city contends that it can enforce the two city charter requirements based on case law that evolved subsequent to the 1970s cases.

The court ordered an expedited schedule so that the issue might be resolved before early June, when ballots must be printed. Briefs, responses, and replies had already been filed in April on motions for summary judgment and dismissal.

Here’s the complete set of briefs in the Dascola case, including the filings from last week.

• 03.28.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Complaint]
• 03.29.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion for Summary Judgment]
• 04.14.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion to Dismiss]
  
• 04.14.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion for SJ]
• 04.18.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply in Support of Motion for SJ]
• 04.18.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion to Dismiss]
• 04.23.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply to Response to Motion to Dismiss]
• 05.06.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Plaintiff's Supplemental Brief]
• 05.06.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Defendant's Supplemental Brief]
• 05.08.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint]
• 05.09.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Response to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint]
• 05.11.14 [.pdf Dascola v. City of A2: Reply to Response to Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint]